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This article marks the 30th anniversary of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s
Baby M decision by offering a critical analysis of surrogacy policy in the United States.
Despite fundamental changes in both science and society since the case was decided,
state courts and legislatures remain bitterly divided on the legality of surrogacy. In
arguing for a more uniform, permissive legal posture toward surrogacy, the article
addresses five central debates in the surrogacy literature.
First, should the legal system accommodate those seeking conception through
surrogacy, or should it prohibit such arrangements? Second, if surrogacy is permitted,
what steps can be taken to minimize the potential exploitation of women who are willing
to rent their wombs for income? Third, what criteria should govern the eligibility to
serve as a surrogate mother and an intended parent? Fourth, what principle(s) should
serve as the basis for determining the parentage of children born through surrogacy?
Fifth, is regulatory uniformity in the surrogacy realm desirable? Is it achievable?
The article concludes that courts and legislatures should accept the validity of
surrogacy contracts, determine parentage according to intent, and identify transparent
criteria for the eligibility of both surrogates and intended parents.
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INTRODUCTION

On February 3, 1988, the Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated a
contractual agreement between William and Elizabeth Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead.1
The Sterns wanted a baby but believed they could not safely conceive; Whitehead
wanted to give “the ‘gift of life’.”2 Their contract stipulated that Whitehead would be
inseminated with William Stern’s semen, gestate the baby, and surrender it to the Sterns
for a fee of $10,000.3
The court’s rejection of the surrogacy contract did not signal a concern that
Whitehead had signed it under duress, or lacked the mental capacity to understand the
contractual terms.4 Nor was the court worried about misrepresentation. Instead, in the
court’s judgment,
[t]he surrogacy contract is based on principles that are directly
contrary to the objectives of our laws. It guarantees the separation of
a child from its mother; it looks to adoption regardless of suitability;
it totally ignores the child; it takes the child from the mother regardless
of her wishes and her maternal fitness; and it does all of this…through
the use of money.5
“There are in a civilized society,” the court concluded, “some things that money cannot
buy.”6
For the past three decades, the Baby M case has cast a shadow over the
regulation of surrogate motherhood in the United States, despite fundamental changes
in both science and society. Scientifically, the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s opinion
was shaped by the fact that Ms. Whitehead was the biological mother of Baby M.
Because her gamete was fertilized by Mr. Stern’s sperm, the court had little difficulty
considering Whitehead the “real” mother of the baby (as illustrated by the quote above).
In contrast, surrogacy arrangements today predominantly use gametes supplied by the
intended mother or an anonymous donor, not the surrogate mother. 7 As a result, the
biological link between surrogate mothers and the babies they gestate is significantly
weaker now than it was in the case of Baby M.8
Sociologically, when Baby M was conceived three decades ago, those seeking
surrogates were most likely to be married, heterosexual, infertile couples. Today,
married, heterosexual couples like the Sterns continue to use surrogate mothers, but so
do same-sex married couples, unmarried couples (both heterosexual and same-sex), and
individuals, sometimes using donated eggs, donated sperm, or both. As Elisabeth
Schwartz observes:

1

In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
Id. at 1236.
3
Id. at 1234.
4
Id. at 1249.
5
Id. at 1250.
6
Id. at 1249.
7
Surrogacy that uses the surrogate’s gamete is called traditional surrogacy, and is now much less
common than gestational surrogacy, in which the surrogate mother does not supply a gamete. See Mark
Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, ABA JOURNAL ONLINE (Mar.
2011),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as_surrogacy_becomes_more_popular_legal_problems_prolife
rate [https://perma.cc/HX9V-CC49].
8
In vitro fertilization (“IVF”) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection are the most common methods.
2
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Times sure have changed. Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) community are enjoying ever-increasing
acceptance in many parts of the developed world. As cultural barriers
and legal restrictions that have obstructed the parenting dreams of
LGBT people gradually loosen, the desire to become parents is no
longer a far-off fantasy. Today, same-sex couples are more able to
avail themselves of family-formation options including adoption and
assisted reproductive technology . . . .9
Indeed, almost 20% of all same sex couples in the U.S. are currently raising children,
some of which were born through surrogacy. 10
In addition to the scientific and sociological changes that have occurred since
the Baby M decision, courts and legislatures across the United States have articulated a
wide range of legal approaches to surrogacy. 11 In the 1993 case of Johnson v. Calvert,
involving a zygote formed from the egg and sperm of the intended parents, the California
Supreme Court found the intended mother to be the child’s “legal, natural” mother, and
held that the surrogacy contract was not “inconsistent with public policy.” 12 In contrast,
in 1992, the New York Legislature passed a law stating that “surrogate parenting
contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and
unenforceable.”13 Beyond New York and California, some states limit intended
surrogate parents to married couples, others place sharp restrictions on who can serve as
a surrogate, a few prohibit payment to surrogates, and still others have been silent about
surrogacy in both legislation and case law. 14 Globally, nations have adopted widely
divergent approaches to surrogacy, from prohibition to acceptance. All the while,
infertility rates among women in the U.S. hover at approximately 12%, and surrogacy
has become “a booming, global business.” 15
There is no better way to mark the 30th anniversary of the Baby M decision than
to reevaluate the legal status of surrogate motherhood. This article looks back at the
debate over surrogacy triggered by the Baby M case, and analyzes five central issues
that continue to divide scholars, policymakers, and the public. It argues that the varied
and often opaque domestic and global regulation of surrogacy fails those who seek
children through surrogacy, those who serve as surrogates, those born to surrogate
mothers, and society more generally. To combat those failures, the article calls for more

9
Elizabeth F. Schwartz, LGBT Issues in Surrogacy: Present and Future Challenges, in HANDBOOK
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES 55 (E. Scott Sills
ed., 2016).
10
Id.
11
For a review of different state approaches, see SUSAN MARKENS, Unity, Divisions, and Strange
Bedfellows: Divergent Legislative Responses to Surrogate Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND
THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 139, 139-70 (2007).
12
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993).
13
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 122 (McKinney 2010). Under New York law, parties, “[a] birth mother
or her husband, a genetic father and his wife, and, if the genetic mother is not the birth mother, the genetic
mother and her husband who violate this section shall be subject to a civil penalty . . .” N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 123 (McKinney 2010).
14
See CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & CULTURE NETWORK, STATE-BY-STATE SURROGACY SUMMARY
(2012), http://www.cbc-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/State-by-State_Surrogacy_Sum_CBC.pdf.
(detailing surrogacy laws in all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
15
PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Private
International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising from International
Surrogacy
Arrangements
11
(2011),
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/f5991e3e-0f8b-430c-b030ca93c8ef1c0a.pdf.
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consistent and permissive regulation of surrogacy. As noted by the author of an
influential book on assisted reproductive technology:
. . . inconsistency and variation together carry a steep price. Because
they make surrogacy a riskier endeavor than it need be: riskier for the
intending parents, who, even in liberal states like California, don’t
fully know whether their contracts are enforceable; and riskier for the
surrogates, who don’t have the same kinds of protection that prevail
in other endeavors.16
No one wins when questions of parentage end up in court, babies are left stateless,
contractual agreements between intended and surrogate parents are contested, and
borders between states and nations are gamed in an effort to find a suitable regulatory
environment for one’s procreative preferences. Moving beyond three decades of legal
limbo and developing a coherent, consistent, and ethical approach to the regulation of
surrogacy is the best way to celebrate the 30-year milestone of Baby M.
Parts II-VI of the article address the following five questions. First, should the
legal system accommodate those seeking conception through surrogacy, or should it
prohibit such arrangements? Second, if surrogacy is permitted, what steps can be taken
to minimize the potential exploitation of women who are willing to rent their wombs for
income, and to ensure that surrogacy does not inappropriately commodify reproduction?
Third, what criteria should govern the eligibility to serve as a surrogate mother and an
intended parent? Fourth, what principle(s) should serve as the basis for determining the
parentage of children born through surrogacy? Fifth, is regulatory uniformity in the
surrogacy realm desirable and is it achievable? These are difficult questions, and
addressing them fully in a short article is not possible. Instead, the article takes note of
the major issues, highlights the range of arguments made by advocates of different
positions, underscores the strongest of those arguments, and argues that after three
decades of debate it is time for a more proactive legal response to surrogacy that moves
beyond current academic disagreements. Rather than another 30 years of debate, the
United States needs a more consistent regulatory posture—one that accepts the validity
of surrogacy contracts, determines parentage according to intent, and identifies criteria
for the eligibility of both surrogates and intended parents. Part VII offers a brief
conclusion.
II.

ACCEPTANCE OR PROHIBITION?

As Richard Storrow pointed out in a recent review of surrogacy in the U.S.,
“the legislative trend, if there is one, is toward legalizing surrogacy where it has been
illegal, or providing a statutory framework for it where it has been practiced with
minimal legislative guidance.”17 There are a number of reasons why one should
welcome this trend. First, as noted above, collective ideas about what constitutes a
couple, and a family, have changed dramatically in the past several decades, underscored
by the legalization of same-sex marriage.18 Many same-sex couples, heterosexual
couples, and individuals desire children but are unable to conceive. For them, surrogacy
offers a route to parenthood, often to children with whom they have at least some genetic
16

DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 94 (2006).
17
Richard Storrow, Surrogacy: American Style, in SURROGACY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 193,
193-216 (Paula Gerber & Katie O’Byrne eds., 2015).
18
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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link. Absent a compelling reason to deny them the opportunity to parent a child, the laws
around surrogacy should be structured to facilitate rather than to thwart their desires.
Second, as a basic matter of social justice, one must be attentive to the gap
between those able to pay the costs associated with surrogacy, and those who lack the
financial resources to afford such an arrangement. The current patchwork of regulations
in the U.S. means that in many cases intended parents must travel to, and spend
significant time in, a state with permissive surrogacy laws.19 In other cases, they leave
the U.S. in search of surrogates abroad.20 More uniform acceptance of surrogacy in the
U.S. will make it more widely available, and will consequently decrease the gap between
those who can afford to enter into a surrogacy arrangement and those who cannot.
Third, and more pragmatically, the genie is already out of the bottle. Over the
past 30 years, the urge to procreate has proven sufficiently strong, and those intent on
hiring a surrogate mother have not hesitated to cross state or national borders in order to
find one.21 With the increasing availability and decreasing cost of ARTs globally, it is
simply too late to effectively prohibit those who want children from entering into some
form of a surrogacy arrangement. Banning surrogacy in some states simply pushes
people to make surrogacy arrangements in surrogacy-friendly states; banning it in all
states would trigger an increase in gestational tourism, a practice in which intended
parents hire surrogates in countries with permissive surrogacy laws that may offer only
limited legal protections to surrogates, leaving them prone to coercion and
exploitation.22 Similarly, when surrogacy is unavailable, demand for alternative means
19

See Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face a Maze of Laws, State by State, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-face-a-maze-of-laws-stateby-state.html (“There is nothing resembling a national consensus on how to handle [surrogacy] . . . and no
federal law, leaving the states free to do as they wish.”); Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States:
State-by-State Interactive Map for Commercial Surrogacy, CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS,
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ [https://perma.cc/A99U-7JFN].
20
See As Demand for Surrogacy Soars, More Countries Are Trying to Ban It, THE ECONOMIST
(May 13, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/international/21721926-many-feminists-and-religiousleaders-regard-it-exploitation-demand-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/FPU5-3EEH]; Cheaper Overseas:
Surrogate Mothers, ABC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=3664065
[https://perma.cc/54RE-T88R]; see also Darlena Cunha, The Hidden Costs of International Surrogacy, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-hidden-costs-ofinternational-surrogacy/382757/ [https://perma.cc/2AQY-VD3H]; Danielle Preiss & Pragati Shahi, The
ATLANTIC
(May
31,
2016),
Dwindling
Options
for
Surrogacy
Abroad,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/05/dwindling-options-for-surrogacy-abroad/484688/
[https://perma.cc/Q9AH-2Y3W]; Ari Shapiro, Surrogate Parenting: A Worldwide Industry, Lacking Global
Rules, NPR (June 11, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/ 11/413406325/surrogateparenting-a-worldwide-industry-lacking-global-rules [https://perma.cc/A8HZ-VDEM] (detailing the use of
surrogates abroad).
21
See Tamara Audi & Arlene Chang, Assembling the Global Baby, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703493504576007774155273928; see also Susan
Donaldson James, Infertile Americans Go to India for Gestational Surrogates, ABC News (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/infertile-americans-india-gestational-surrogates/story?id=20808125
[https://perma.cc/8DLE-MDGR]; Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face a Maze of Laws, State by State,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-face-a-mazeof-laws-state-by-state.html?_r=0; Douglas Pet, Make Me a Baby As Fast As You Can, SLATE (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/01/reproductive_tourism_how_surrogacy_provider_pl
anethospital_speeds_up_pregnancies_and_lowers_costs_.html [https://perma.cc/D67N-TL7K] (discussing
the lengths some people will go to have a child).
22
Martha Field, Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1155, 1181-82 (2014) (noting that
“attempts to forbid surrogacy are likely to result either in travel for surrogacy or in a robust black market…
once the public knows that surrogacy can be accomplished as a scientific matter, it will be practiced, legally
or illegally”); see also Sheela Saravanan, Addressing Global Inequalities in Surrogacy, in HANDBOOK OF
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES (E. Scott Sills, ed.,
2016).
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of bearing children, like uterine transplants, will increase, imposing higher costs and
greater risks on individuals and couples.23
Fourth, the legal system is well-equipped to manage surrogacy. A more
permissive legal stance toward surrogacy requires that contracts between surrogate
mothers and intended parents be encouraged and enforced.24 Of course, enforcing a
surrogacy contract does not mean that surrogates will be forced to do certain things they
may find objectionable. Surrogate mothers cannot be denied their constitutional right to
an abortion, for example, or be forced to abide by contractual terms that micromanage
their behavior, like requiring them to adhere to a particular exercise regimen. 25 Indeed,
contracts governing surrogacy agreements are prime examples of relational contracts, in
which specific contractual terms are informed by social norms, informal understandings,
and emotions.26 Nonetheless, although specific performance may not always be
required, surrogacy contracts must be legally enforceable, meaning surrogate mothers
will be held to contractual terms that require them to give up their parental rights and
relinquish the children they gestate. 27
For 30 years, scholars have debated the merits and pitfalls of surrogacy, and
they could easily do so for another 30.28 There are serious issues at the heart of the debate
about which people are likely to remain divided; premising policy action on substantive
consensus is a guarantee of inaction. Instead, while debates about contracts,
commodification, and exploitation continue, policymakers must weigh the relative costs
of action versus inaction. Policies permitting surrogacy are not cost-free, but they
represent the most acceptable way forward.29 As Elizabeth Scott wrote in her survey of
legal and social issues surrounding surrogacy in the 20 years after the Baby M case,
“well-designed regulation can greatly mitigate most of the potential tangible harms of
surrogacy, and this would seem to be the appropriate function of law in a liberal society
in response to an issue on which no societal consensus exists.”30
III.

MITIGATING EXPLOITATION AND COMMODIFICATION

23
John A. Robertson, Other Women’s Wombs: Uterus Transplants and Gestational Surrogacy, 3
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 68, 68 (2016).
24
See generally, I. Glenn Cohen & Katherine L. Kraschel, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements:
Enforcement and Breach, in HANDBOOK OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL
PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES (E. Scott Sills, ed., 2016) (providing a general discussion of surrogacy contracts
and enforcement).
25
MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 79 (1988) (stating “it seems unimaginable that the
law would enforce a contract to undergo an abortion”).
26
Hillary L. Berk, The Legalization of Emotion: Managing Risk by Managing Feelings in
Contracts for Surrogate Labor, 49 L. & S OC ’ Y R EV . 143, 148 (2015).
27
Field, supra note 25 at 79 (arguing that personal service contracts are not enforceable by specific
performance. But once the baby is born, says Field, the idea that a personal service contract cannot be enforced
by specific performance is no longer helpful to a surrogate, because performance has been completed, so this
would be like the transfer of a completed object).
28
See FRANCE WINDDANCE TWINE, OUTSOURCING THE WOMB (2011) (giving a recent, thoughtful
analysis of surrogacy, comparatively).
29
For a detailed argument for how regulating surrogacy can work effectively to protect the interests
of intended parents and surrogates, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial
Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1227 (2013) (arguing “that in transactions of commercial intimacy such as
surrogate motherhood, regulation should be formulated that respects the benefits of commercial transaction
while taking seriously the relational intimacy and potential exploitation involved in surrogate motherhood.”).
30
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
109, 146 (2009).
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EXPLOITATION

What can be done to best ensure that surrogate motherhood does not exploit
poor women who are willing to serve as surrogate mothers because they are desperate
for cash? As a starting point, it should be acknowledged that in almost all cases surrogate
mothers will be less financially secure than the intended parent(s) for whom they are
gestating a child.31 Financial inequality however, does not necessarily lead to financial
exploitation. The important question is whether those who serve as surrogates agree to
do so out of financial desperation, and thus lack any bargaining power when entering a
contractual relationship. Do they have other income options? Are their human rights
being violated by limiting their activities, food choices, or ability to terminate their
pregnancy while serving as surrogates?32
Qualitative studies of surrogate mothers indicate that contrary to the claims of
scholars who describe surrogate mothers as most likely to be poor, single, ethnic
minorities, surrogates are generally white, often married, and usually financially
stable.33 Whereas Anita Allen paints a bleak picture of “a new, virulent, form of racial
and class discrimination,” in which “thousands of poor and minority women will likely
be used as a ‘breeder class,’” the reality is that “women of color are greatly underrepresented as surrogate mothers.” 34 Significantly, a comprehensive review of the
empirical literature on surrogate mothers concludes that “surrogate mothers are mature,
experienced, stable, self-aware, extroverted non-conformists who make the initial
decision that surrogacy is something that they want to do.” 35 Importantly, it does not
find that surrogate mothers in the U.S. are exploited, or are unable to meaningfully
consent to being surrogates.36
Perhaps the empirical literature paints a misleadingly positive picture of
surrogate mothers in the United States, but it is the most accurate picture currently
available, and it should at the very least call into question some of the negative
assumptions and stereotypes about surrogacy. Outside of the U.S. and other
industrialized democracies, however, there is greater cause for concern. For those who
desire children but find the American regulatory climate and cost prohibitive, gestational
tourism is an oft-traveled path. Countries that are destinations for such gestational
tourism are generally economically underdeveloped, and expose women to the
possibility of exploitation.37 Weak legal protections make surrogates vulnerable to
contractual clauses that control their behavior in a variety of circumstances; surrogates
may be housed in dehumanizing communal shelters; and the payment offered to

31
One can imagine a health insurance system that fully covered the costs of surrogacy, and which
as a result made such services available regardless of the assets of intended parents. But that is not currently
the case.
32
For a detailed examination of surrogacy in India, see generally AMRITA PANDE, WOMBS IN
LABOR: TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN INDIA (2014).
33
Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets
Empirical Research on Surrogate Motherhood, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 34, 40-41 (2010). For a thoughtful
review of the empirical literature on surrogacy, see Lina Peng, Surrogate Mothers: An Exploration of the
Empirical and the Normative, 21 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 555, 560-561 (2013).
34
Anita L. Allen, The Socio-Economic Struggle for Equality: The Black Surrogate Mother, 8
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17 (1991); see also Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough
Waters: An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 31 (2005).
35
Busby & Vun, supra note 33, at 25.
36
Id. at 46.
37
PANDE, supra note 32, at 172-73; Raywat Deonandan, Recent Trends in Reproductive Tourism
and International Surrogacy: Ethical Considerations and Challenges for Policy, 8 RISK MGMT. &
HEALTHCARE POL’Y 111 (2015).
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surrogates can be egregiously low.38 The concerns that fuel opposition to surrogacy in
the U.S. are thus significantly magnified in places where some Americans desirous of
children have sought surrogates, like India, Thailand, Ukraine, and Mexico.39
To the extent that concerns remain about the exploitation of surrogate mothers
both within and outside of the U.S., they can be addressed partially by ensuring that
surrogates have their own legal representation. Such representation can be paid for by
agencies offering surrogacy services, with the cost passed through to intended parents.
By guaranteeing that surrogates are able to consult with attorneys who can help them to
understand the terms of their surrogacy contracts, advocate for adequate compensation,
and help to protect their individual rights, opportunities for the exploitation of surrogates
will be greatly reduced.40 Concerns about the exploitation of surrogates overseas may
also be addressed by advocating for a more permissive legal regime for surrogacy in the
United States. Reducing demand for gestational tourism will decrease the potential for
coercion and exploitation that too often threatens to undermine international surrogacy
arrangements.
B.

COMMODIFICATION

Feminists, medical ethicists, legal scholars, human rights advocates, and others
have articulated thoughtful arguments not only about the potential exploitation of
vulnerable women whose economic circumstances drive them to work as surrogates, but
also about what they consider to be the unpalatable commodification of reproduction
that results from paying someone to bear a child.41 Such objections are difficult to
counter, because they focus on a type of harm that is challenging to sharply define. As
Elizabeth Scott notes, “the harms of commodification are abstract and not subject to
empirical validation. How could it be determined whether surrogacy has changed the
way that children or women’s reproductive capacity is valued?”42
One can proffer data about the economic conditions of surrogates that defies
claims that surrogacy takes advantage of lower income women, and one can empirically
study the financial arrangements between surrogates and intended parents to
demonstrate that they represent reasonable contractual terms. But data about the material
conditions of surrogacy will do little to persuade those whose concerns are less about
money per se than about surrogacy’s impact on how society values and understands
human reproduction. With what sort of evidence can one refute the claim that a
contractual relationship between surrogates and intended parents inevitably turns
38
Normann Witzleb & Anurag Chawla, Surrogacy in India: Strong Demand, Weak Laws, in
SURROGACY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paula Gerber & Katie O’Byrne eds., 2015).
39
Id.
40
Parties to surrogacy arrangements would also be well served by building into their contracts
some form of alternative dispute resolution. Litigation may loom as a possibility when relationships sour, but
mediation (for example) is likely to be a faster, less costly, and more satisfactory way of handling conflicts.
Keeping conflicts out of court will also avoid a sticky jurisdictional issue—whose jurisdiction governs
surrogacy contracts, and where should conflicts be litigated.
41
See, e.g., Jennifer A. Parks, Gestational Surrogacy and the Feminist Perspective, in HANDBOOK
OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES 25 (E. Scott Sills,
ed., 2016). Parks contrasts the views of feminist care ethicists and liberal feminists, noting that “there are a
number of feminist perspectives on the rising practice of gestational commercial surrogacy (both domestic
and international) that lead to differing conclusions about the morality of the practice.”
42
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
109, 125 (2009) (“The framing of surrogacy as commodification was shaped and promoted by feminists and
religious leaders who amplified its social meaning as baby-selling and the exploitation of women. These
groups were driven by different ideological and political goals, but they forged an effective political alliance
that played an important role in shaping the law for years to come.”).
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women into baby production machines? What data—quantitative or qualitative—speaks
to the concern that offering payment to a woman to bear a child does not necessarily
turn babies into fungible commercial products?43
Perhaps the most compelling response to those who worry about
commodification is to point out that those who support surrogacy most decidedly do not
support baby selling. What is the difference? Baby selling is just that—put a price tag
on the good (a child) and sell it to someone willing to meet the asking price. The money
exchanged is explicitly for the purchase of the child, just like the money one pays for a
car is for the acquisition of a car. Surrogacy arrangements do not involve putting a price
on a baby, but instead focus on paying surrogate mothers for their medical care, lost
wages, health insurance, and more. As Glenn Cohen convincingly writes,
“compensation for the medical costs and lost wages of a mother in a surrogacy contract
is different from buying children or commercial surrogacy. The former transactions
recognize that the money is not a substitute for the child—that some value remains
uncompensated—whereas the latter do not.”44
If the concern about commodification and surrogacy is that any money is
changing hands, then all one can do is to point out that procreation in the 21st century
does not simply involve the coupling of a man and a woman. It is shaped by a wide
variety of factors—science, technology, social norms, explicit policy choices, and
perhaps most of all, the market. Starting well before a woman becomes pregnant and
continuing well past the birth of a child, the conception, gestation, and birth of a child
implicates a wide range of expensive technologies and carries a broad array of costs.
Some may bemoan the marriage of the market with human conception, and there are
surely some reasons for concern. But even if there is desire to go back to the halcyon
days of simple human reproduction (if they ever existed) it is too late to do so, and it
would be unwise to reject surrogacy for involving the same sort of financial transaction
that characterized the entire procreative process.45
IV.

ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

A third foundational issue concerns the eligibility criteria for both surrogates
and intended parents. What types of legal limitations, if any, should be imposed on those
who desire to have a child through surrogacy? What about the requirements for those
who want to serve as surrogates? Across the U.S., and globally, there are a number of
limitations on intended parents. Most frequently, they exclude individuals, and/or same
sex couples, and/or unmarried couples from becoming intended parents. The
justification for such limitations is not generally articulated, perhaps because making a
logical case for their appropriateness is difficult, but the underlying view appears to be
that married, heterosexual couples provide the “best” environment for raising children.
Regardless of such stereotypes, there is no reason why marital status or sexual

43
Id. at 112 (“Critics [of surrogate motherhood] claimed that surrogacy degraded children and
women by treating children as commodities to be exchanged for profit and women’s bodies as childbearing
factories; the arrangements also degraded the mother–child relationship by paying women not to bond with
their children.”).
44
I. Glenn Cohen, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification
Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 707 (2003).
45
SPAR, supra note 16. See MARTHA ERTMAN, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND
READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (2005); MICHELLE B. GOODWIN, BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW
POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES, (2010); Margaret Jane Radin, From Babyselling to Boilerplate: Reflections
on the Limits of the Infrastructures of the Market, 54 OSGOODE HALL L. J. (forthcoming 2017).
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orientation should be disqualifying for surrogacy, just as they are not disqualifying for
same-sex couples seeking to adopt, or unmarried couples choosing to conceive.
Still, not everyone is well-suited to being a surrogate parent. Ensuring that
surrogacy is in the best interests of the child requires the identification of potentially
disqualifying characteristics. In establishing eligibility criteria for adoption, the
Children’s Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services is broadly
inclusive: “Most people are eligible to adopt, regardless of whether they are married or
single, their age, income, or sexual orientation. Having a disability does not
automatically disqualify a prospective adoptive parent.” 46 Nor is a criminal record
disqualifying, unless it involves a child-related offense.47 During the 150-year history of
adoption in the U.S., states have developed a relatively uniform set of criteria governing
who may adopt.48 Those criteria establish a baseline, but more stringent standards should
be imposed on intended surrogate parents, at least until surrogacy is a well-established
practice. Protecting the best interests of children born through surrogacy counsels that
intended parents be physically and psychologically stable, have no disqualifying
criminal history (most misdemeanors are not disqualifying, whereas most felony
convictions are), have the financial means to raise a healthy child, and do not abuse
drugs or alcohol. Many surrogacy agencies impose at least some of these limitations,
but a more uniform approach to the eligibility of intended parents would underscore the
importance of the best interests of the child in surrogacy arrangements. 49
Determining who can act as a surrogate mother owes less to adoption and more
to the accumulated experience of different jurisdictions and organizations that have
regulated and offered surrogacy services. Although there is some variation, among the
most widely used criteria are that women serving as surrogates must have previously
given birth to (and in some cases, raised) a child; must be between 21 and 40, must be
financially stable (often meaning that they cannot be living in state-sponsored housing
and must have private medical insurance), must have a healthy lifestyle (no smoking or
drug use), and must be U.S. citizens or legal residents.50 The requirements for serving
as a surrogate mother have in general been less controversial than those for being an
intended parent.51 Of the many concerns that plague the regulation of surrogacy, they
represent an area of relative calm.
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DETERMINING PARENTAGE

Who should be considered the legal parent(s) of a child born through
surrogacy? In the Baby M case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had little difficulty in
finding that Mr. Stern was the baby’s father. 52 Determining motherhood was a more
challenging task, at least in part because Mrs. Stern was the intended mother but was
not biologically related to Baby M, whereas Mary Beth Whitehead provided her gamete
and gestated the baby.53 In the court’s view, Whitehead was the mother; Mrs. Stern could
only become Baby M’s legal mother through adoption. 54
A somewhat different conflict over parenthood arose in the Baby Mukai case,
in which a Japanese media personality, Aki Mukai, and her professional wrestler
husband, Nobuhiko Takada, arranged for a surrogate to bear their child. 55 A de facto ban
on surrogacy in Japan led Mukai and Takada to find a jurisdiction that would allow them
to contract with a surrogate mother.56 They chose Nevada, where in 2003 two embryos
created with Mukai’s eggs and Takada’s sperm were implanted in a surrogate. 57 Unlike
Whitehead, Cindy (the surrogate) willingly relinquished the babies, and Mukai and
Takada obtained a birth certificate from Nevada listing them as the baby’s legal
parents.58 When they returned to Japan with their twins, however, the Japanese
government refused to recognize Mukai as the mother, triggering a legal conflict over
parentage that languished until Mukai legally adopted the children five years later. 59
Baby M and Baby Mukai are just two examples of how surrogacy, together
with in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), egg donation, and sperm donation, have reshaped
conceptions of parenthood, and highlighted the distinction between genetic, gestational,
and legal parentage. Who are the legal parents of a baby gestated by a surrogate when
the intended parents have used a donated egg and the intended father’s sperm to create
a zygote? What about when both the egg and sperm are donated? How will the use of
artificial wombs affect the determination of legal parentage?60 In vitro gametogenesis
(“IVG”), which enables the creation of both eggs and sperm from skin cells, further
complicates the picture—not only can individuals in same-sex relationships both be
genetically related to their child, but a single individual’s cells can be used to create both
eggs and sperm.61 Equally challenging is “multiplex parenting,” involving a gamete
derived from two people that is combined with a gamete from a third individual. “Would
we view each of those three as equal genetic parents, or do we give greater rights and
duties to the parent who contributed more genetic material?”62 When surrogacy and IVG
are combined, the situation becomes even more vexing.
52
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There are clearly no simple answers when it comes to determining parentage.
Gestation, genetics, and social factors all matter, but which matters more, and how
should courts adjudicate their relative importance when making decisions about legal
parentage?63 In an article published in 1990, Marjorie Shultz argues that intent, as
evidenced in contractual agreements or in other ways, should motivate the legal
determination of parentage.64 In her view, if a person or persons desiring a child hire a
surrogate, the agreement reveals an intent to parent the child, so the legal parent(s) of
the child is/are the person/couple who hired the surrogate. 65 As Shultz puts it, the
legal rules governing modern procreative arrangements and parental
status should recognize the importance and the legitimacy of
individual efforts to project intentions and decisions into the future.
Where such intentions are deliberate, explicit and bargained for,
where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations, as is the case
in technologically-assisted reproductive arrangements, they should be
honored.66
In reaching its decision in Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court
underscored that view, concluding that “she who intended to procreate the child -- that
is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
own -- is the natural mother under California law.” 67
Intent is never a perfect solution; it is frequently ambiguous and contested. But
it has a number of benefits. It moves beyond old and outmoded approaches to
parenthood, which generally assume that biological, gestational, and legal parentage will
overlap. It puts individuals, same-sex couples, heterosexual couples, and
married/unmarried couples on equal footing by making clear that parenthood is a
determination based on social, as well as, biological factors.68 And it takes into account
the wide range of procreative choices that have been enabled by technological and
sociological change, and that will continue to be enabled in the future.
VI.

LEGAL UNIFORMITY

The fifth and final question this paper addresses is how to manage the crossborder inconsistency of surrogacy laws and regulations. As Debora Spar notes,
What the surrogacy market lacks . . . is any kind of clear and consistent
regulatory framework. Instead it is pockmarked by legal and
jurisdictional inconsistencies—by the sharp divisions that linger
63
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between states that prohibit payment for surrogacy and those that
permit it; states that enforce surrogacy contracts and those that do not;
and states that have specific regulations regarding the terms of
surrogacy arrangements and those that are mute. 69
American-style federalism leaves a great many policy decisions in the hands of the
states, including most of those involving health and welfare. A common justifications
for this delegation of power was articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, where he wrote in dissent: “It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”70 In a recent article, Martha Field, an influential voice in the debate over
surrogacy, echoed Brandeis’s approach, arguing that having different surrogacy laws in
different states is advantageous because “the states and the public can learn from the
implementation of different systems and will eventually have a better basis, including
an empirical basis, for forming their surrogacy policy.” 71 The idea of states as
laboratories for democracy may be appealing, but at some point society must pause the
collection of evidence and analyze the accumulated data. Is there any? Field says little
about the empirical evidence gathered over the past three decades, and offers no
indication that any state has changed its surrogacy policy on the basis of such empirical
evidence.72 For the foreseeable future, it seems clear that states will continue to take
divergent approaches to surrogacy, regardless of (or in the absence of) the evidence
generated in state “laboratories.” Assuming that is true, is it a problem? And if so, what
can be done?
There are at least two reasons to be concerned about the divergent legal
approaches to surrogacy embraced by different states. First, not all approaches to
surrogacy are equally justifiable. To the contrary, some laws and regulations aimed at
surrogacy are sounder than others.73 It is important, for example, for states to have
surrogacy laws that do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or marital
status. Legal protections ensuring that surrogate mothers are not exploited or coerced
are essential. Contracts between intended parents and surrogates should be honored, not
systematically rejected.74 Surrogacy regulations are not all created equal; after three
decades of incompatible state regulation, it is time to make a choice.
Second, regulatory diversity exacerbates those aspects of surrogacy that attract
the most pointed criticism. To the extent that there are legitimate concerns about the
exploitation of economically disadvantaged women and the commodification of both
women and children, for example, the piecemeal regulation of surrogacy in the U.S.
sharpens those worries. The divide between the haves and have nots—between those
69
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with and without financial and educational resources—will inevitably be underscored if
surrogacy is an option only for those who can figure out which states permit surrogacy,
and then hire a surrogate in one of those states. The criticism becomes even sharper if
one considers surrogacy options outside of the U.S.; gestational tourism is a prerogative
of the well-off, and surrogacy outside of the U.S. is more likely to involve parties who
lack basic legal protections.
However conceived, surrogacy involves contracting out the gestation of one’s
child. It is not cost-free, and those with greater resources will enjoy a greater range of
options. But those facts alone do not mean that surrogacy should be rejected, assumed
to be exploitative, or charged with commodifying the un-commodifiable. Instead, with
careful regulatory choices and a configuration of laws within and among the fifty states
that do not create or amplify preexisting inequities, surrogacy can offer a viable route to
parenthood for those who might otherwise not be able to conceive.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The solution to the inconsistent legal treatment of surrogacy across the fifty
states is easily stated but difficult to achieve—the creation of a (more) uniform
regulatory approach to surrogacy. 75 Instead of ad hoc decisions made by courts, state
legislatures need to get more involved. As the court in In re Marriage of Buzzanca wrote:
Again we must call on the Legislature to sort out the parental rights
and responsibilities of those involved in artificial reproduction . . . .
Courts can continue to make decisions on an ad hoc basis without
necessarily imposing some grand scheme, looking to the imperfectly
designed Uniform Parentage Act and a growing body of case law for
guidance in the light of applicable family law principles. Or the
Legislature can act to impose a broader order which, even though it
might not be perfect on a case-by-case basis, would bring some
predictability to those who seek to make use of artificial reproductive
techniques.76
Coordinating legislation in different states is a significant challenge. Various
efforts have been, and continue to be, made to achieve some uniformity in the regulation
of surrogacy, both within and beyond the U.S., but they have gained little traction.77
Congress took an interest in regulating surrogacy in the late 1980s, largely with the
intent to prohibit it, but that effort failed.78 Yet a more active Congressional posture is
both possible and desirable. In an article exploring legislative approaches to surrogacy
in the U.S., Alta Charo argues that the cross-border nature of surrogacy enables federal
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government regulation on the basis of the Commerce Clause, and urges the government
to press for the harmonization of state surrogacy laws. 79 In her view, harmonization
could be achieved thorough the development of standard contract provisions, making
challenge grants available to states so that they can study legislative options, drafting a
model law, or passing a joint resolution asking states to adopt a model law developed
by a professional organization like the American Bar Association (“ABA”).80 Congress
has thus far done none of those things, and the current political climate in the U.S. does
not bode well for this type of bold political action. Nonetheless, federal government
action is essential to the crafting of a more uniform legal approach to surrogacy in the
states.
Beyond Congress, some organizations have pressed for a consistent legal
approach to surrogacy. In 1988, for example, the ABA’s Section of Family Law adopted
the Model Surrogacy Act.81 The Act, primarily focused on traditional surrogacy
arrangements, endorsed enforceable contractual surrogacy agreements, suggested that
surrogates be compensated between $7,500 and $12,500, proposed a simplified
procedure (as opposed to adoption) of awarding parentage to the intended parents, and
envisioned the creation of state-licensed agencies to handle surrogacy.82 The Act has
gone through a number of iterations, most recently in the 2008 Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technology, which adopts and updates many of the provisions
endorsed by the ABA 20 years earlier, including the validity of surrogacy contracts, the
acceptability of paying surrogates a “reasonable fee”, and the legal parentage of the
intended parents.83 Despite the ABA’s effort, there is little to suggest that it has had
much influence.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”) has also proposed legislation for regulating surrogacy, contained in
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), but it has had a limited impact.84 Only
11 states have adopted parts of the 2002 UPA, and just two (Texas and Utah) have
enacted the surrogacy provisions of Article 8.85 In 2017 the NCCUSL recommendations
for determining the parentage of children born through surrogacy were updated, but for
now it is too early to know if that effort will have an impact on state policy. In short,
despite the many challenges aspiring parents face when confronted by the current
patchwork of state policies governing surrogacy, there is little indication that either the
federal government or state governments will expend much effort to achieve a greater
degree of policy harmonization.
A similar lack of political will is evident globally, where one continues to
observe a high degree of policy heterogeneity. In 2015, the Permanent Bureau of the
79
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Hague Conference on Private International Law convened an Experts Group to study
the private international law issues raised by surrogacy, particularly those involving
fundamental human rights included in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child—
nationality, immigration status, and parentage. 86 At the request of the U.S. Department
of State, the ABA weighed in on the merits of drafting a new Convention on
international surrogacy, and argued forcefully against doing so. 87 Citing the importance
of “local culture and concerns” over surrogacy, the ABA argued that it would be
inappropriate to support the creation of uniform rules for regulating surrogacy in
different countries.88 With the U.S. opposing efforts to harmonize national surrogacy
laws, one can expect little progress on that front.
The 30th anniversary of the Baby M case thus stands as a stark reminder of how
little progress has been made in shaping consistent and coherent laws to regulate
surrogacy. In the three decades since the Supreme Court of New Jersey issued its
decision, reproductive medicine has rapidly evolved, and social norms as well as formal
laws have redefined the meaning of marriage and family. Yet state courts and
legislatures remain divided in their views of surrogacy, and those seeking to have
children through surrogacy continue to operate in a climate of grave uncertainty. For
now, one can only greet the anniversary of Baby M with a mixture of humility and
disappointment; humility because the choices people make about bearing children are
always so deeply complex and personal, and disappointment because despite profound
changes in science and society, legal uncertainty about surrogacy has persisted for 30
years, and is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
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